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Abstract. Economic growth in Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Asia, countries of the 
former USSR, Africa and Latin America were analysed. It is demonstrated that the 
fundamental postulate of the Unified Growth Theory about the existence of the three 
regimes of growth (Malthusian regime, post-Malthusian regime and sustained-growth 
regime) is contradicted by data. These regimes did not exist. In particular, there was no 
escape from the Malthusian trap because there was no trap. Economic growth in all these 
regions was not stagnant but hyperbolic. Unified Growth Theory is fundamentally 
incorrect. However, this theory is also dangerously misleading because it claims a transition 
from the endless epoch of stagnation to the new era of sustained economic growth, the 
interpretation creating the sense of security and a promise of prosperity. The data show that 
the opposite is true. Economic growth in the past was sustained and secure. Now, it is 
supported by the increasing ecological deficit. The long-term sustained and secure 
economic growth has yet to be created. It did not happen automatically, as suggested 
incorrectly by the Unified Growth Theory. 
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1. Introduction 
here is no science without data but there is also no science without scientific 
analysis of data. We can have excellent data but if we do not analyse them 
properly we are likely to draw incorrect conclusions. A perfect example is 
the Unified Growth Theory (Galor, 2005a, 2011). Excellent data (Maddison, 2001) 
were available and even used during its formulation but they were never properly 
analysed. Now, it can be easily demonstrated that the fundamental postulates of 
this theory are repeatedly contradicted by data, making it fundamentally incorrect 
and, consequently, unacceptable. 
Many attractive theories and explanations can be formulated but if they are not 
based firmly on the rigorous analysis of data they are only, at best, just interesting 
stories. They may contain elements of truth but folklores of many cultures are full 
of such stories and they also contain elements of truth. Fantasy and leaps of faith 
might be inspiring and productive even in scientific research but they have to be 
soon tested by the scientific process of investigation.  
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However, if one leap of faith is followed by another, if one fantasy creates 
another, then we no longer deal with science but with fiction. It is then easy to 
loose scientific perspective and defend emotionally the widely-accepted dogmas, 
based on faith.   
Any theory that cannot be checked by data is unacceptable even if it is based on 
scientifically attractive ideas. Such a theory has to be put aside until it can be 
checked by relevant data.  Even if a theory is confirmed by many sets of data it can 
be still challenged by a single set of contradicting data. Any theory contradicted by 
just one set of good data has to be either revised or rejected. Any research, any 
intellectual activity, which ignores these fundamental principles of scientific 
investigation is unscientific even if it is intellectually stimulating and attractive.  
In science it is important to look for data confirming theoretical explanations 
but it is even more important to discover contradicting evidence, because data 
confirming a theory confirm only what we already know but contradicting 
evidence may lead to new discoveries.  
If scientific analysis of data is found to be in agreement with a proposed theory, 
this theory may then be considered to be supported by data and its explanations of 
studied phenomena may then be accepted. However, if just one set of data is found 
to be in contradiction with this theory, then this theory can no longer be accepted in 
its original form. It has to be then either modified to bring it in agreement with 
data, or rejected if such modification is impossible. There is no scientific gain in 
accepting such a theory. On the contrary, its continuing acceptance is detrimental 
to science.   
When an incorrect theory is rejected we can then look for a better explanation of 
studied phenomena. There are no sentimental values in scientific research and no 
emotional attachments, and any scientist should be prepared to have his or her 
theories challenged by science. 
 
2. Unified Growth Theory 
Currently, the most complete theory of the historical economic growth appears 
to be the Unified Growth Theory (Galor, 2005a, 2011). It follows closely the 
traditional interpretations of economic growth. One of its fundamental postulates is 
the existence of the three regimes of growth. It claims that the historical economic 
growth in various countries and regions can be divided into three distinctly 
different regimes of growth governed by distinctly different mechanisms. We shall 
show that these three regimes did not exist. 
The alleged regimes are:  
1. The regime of Malthusian stagnation. According to Galor, and indeed 
according to the currently accepted interpretations, this regime “characterized most 
of human history” (Galor, 2005a, p. 178). Economic growth was allegedly in the 
endless state of stagnation described as the Malthusian trap or “the Malthusian 
steady-state equilibrium” (e.g. Galor, 2005a. pp. 236, 237, 244). Galor claims that 
this epoch of stagnation commenced in 100,000 BC (Galor 2008a, 2012a) and was 
terminated in around AD 1750, or around the time of the Industrial Revolution, 
1760-1840 (Floud &  McCloskey, 1994) in developed regions and around AD 1900 
in less-developed regions.  
The beginning of this regime in 100,000 BC is highly speculative because 
Maddison’s data do not extend to the BC era. Furthermore, the emergence of Homo 
Sapiens is usually claimed to have been around 200,000 BC or maybe even earlier 
(Weaver, Roseman, & Stringer, 2008). We simply do not know about the economic 
growth in such a distant past because we do not have relevant data. Judging by the 
available evidence (Nielsen, 2016a, 2016b, 2016c), the growth was probably 
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hyperbolic but whatever we might want to suggest will be based on speculations. 
However, we do not have to go so far back in time to test the Unified Growth 
Theory because the postulate of the existence of the three regimes of growth cannot 
be even tested using the economic growth data for the BC era. Even if such data 
were available they would be inapplicable for this purpose. The existence of the 
three regimes of growth is not claimed for the BC era but only for the AD era 
because all of them were supposed to have been manifested around the time of the 
Industrial Revolution.  The data we need to use are the data of Maddison (2001,  
2010) because they cover the time when the alleged three regimes were supposed 
to have existed. 
2. The post-Malthusian regime. According to Galor (2008a, 2012a), this 
regime was between AD 1750 and 1870 for developed regions but it commenced a 
little later, in around AD 1900, for less-developed regions. Thus, the alleged escape 
from the Malthusian trap and the commencement of the fast economic growth 
occurred around the onset of the Industrial Revolution for developed regions and a 
little later for less-developed regions. 
3. The sustained-growth regime. According to Galor (2008a, 2012a), this 
regime commenced around AD 1870 for developed regions.  
The general idea of this interpretation of the historical economic growth is that 
after the endless epoch of “the Malthusian steady-state equilibrium,” humans were 
finally able to break through the impenetrable barrier of stagnation, escape the 
Malthusian trap and enter into a new era of sustained and rapid economic growth. 
This concept is not only incorrect but also dangerous because the data describing 
the historical economic growth (Maddison, 2001, 2010) present a diametrically 
opposite interpretation. The economic growth was sustained and secure in the past 
(Nielsen, 2016a) but now it entered a stage of the insecure future (Nielsen, 2015a). 
We shall now demonstrate that Golor’s concept of the three regimes of growth 
is contradicted by the economic growth data (Maddison, 2010). We shall show that 
his three regimes of growth have no correlation with data and no positive 
connection with the real world. Within the range of the mathematically-analysable 
data, there was no stagnation and no transition to a fast economic growth, 
described as the sustained-growth regime or the modern-growth regime. We shall 
show that during this alleged new, fast-increasing and sustained-growth regime, 
economic growth started to be diverted from the fast-increasing historical 
hyperbolic trajectories to slower trajectories.  
Historical economic growth, global and regional, was so well sustained that it 
followed stable hyperbolic trajectories. However, such trajectories escape to 
infinity at a fixed time and any growth, which follows them, has to be, at a certain 
stage, diverted to a slower trajectory. Economic growth, global and regional, is 
now diverted to slower trajectories. However, the momentum gained during the 
sustained historical growth keeps on propelling the economic growth along 
trajectories, which are still increasing too fast to feel comfortable about their future.       
Galor’s Unified Growth Theory is not based on the scientific analysis of data. 
He had access to the excellent set of data (Maddison, 2001) but he did not analyse 
them. Now, precisely the same data can be used to show that his theory is 
fundamentally incorrect.  
Regrettably, Unified Growth Theoryis based on impressions created by the 
customary disfigured presentation of data (Ashraf, 2009; Galor, 2005a, 2005b,  
2008a, 2008b, 2008c, 2010, 2011, 2012a, 2012b, 2012c; Galor & Moav, 2002; 
Snowdon & Galor, 2008). Example of such distorted presentation of data is shown 
in Figure 1. Such a way of handling data is a perfect prescription for drawing 
incorrect conclusions. (All figures are presented in the Appendix.) 
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In science, data are treated with respect because the primary aim of science is to 
discover the truth, and for this purpose there is nothing as reliable as good sets of 
data. Not all data can be accepted but we have to have good reasons for rejecting 
data. If reasons for rejecting data are unacceptable, then reasons for rejecting data 
have to be rejected. 
Many attractive theories and explanations may be formulated but they all have 
to pass the test of data. Without such a test, they are just stories, which might or 
might not be true.  
Galor’s predecessors might be excused for believing in the existence of 
Malthusian stagnation and in the dramatic impact of the Industrial Revolution on 
changing the economic growth trajectories because they were using strongly 
limited information. They had no access to the excellent source of data published 
by the world-renown economist (Maddison, 2001). Galor not only had access to 
these data but he also used them repeatedly during the formulation of his theory but 
unfortunately he distorted them so much that they were creating an impression of 
being in agreement with his postulates. 
In our discussion we shall use the latest data describing economic growth 
(Maddison, 2010). This publication contains some additional information but any 
of Maddison’s compilations, the compilation used by Galor or this new 
compilation, can be used to demonstrate that the Unified Growth Theory is 
contradicted by data. The advantage of using the new compilation (Maddison, 
2010) is that it helps to understand the recent transitions to slower trajectories 
because the earlier compilation was now extended to include the data for the 21
st
 
century. 
 
3. Method of analysis and related issues 
We shall use two ways of displaying data: (1) semilogarithmic display of the 
GDP data and (2) the display of their reciprocal values, 1/GDP. These two types of 
display are suitable for studying data varying over a large range of values. The 
GDP values will be expressed in billions of 1990 International Geary-Khamis 
dollars. 
Hyperbolic distributions, which describe the historical economic growth 
(Nielsen, 2016a), are represented by the simple mathematical formula: 
1( )  ( )S t a kt        (1) 
where, in our case, ( )S t is the GDP while a and k are positive constants.   
The reciprocal values of hyperbolic distributions are represented by straight 
lines: 
1
 
( )
a kt
S t
       (2) 
In general, hyperbolic growth can be uniquely identified by the decreasing 
straight line of the reciprocal values of the size of the growing entity in much the 
same way as the exponential growth can be identified by their logarithm. 
Reciprocal values of data can also help in identifying easily any deviations from 
hyperbolic trend because deviations from a straight line are easy to notice.  
In using the reciprocal values it should be remembered that a deviation to a 
slower trajectory is indicated by an upward bending away from the previous linear 
trend while deviations to faster trajectories are indicated by downward bending. In 
particular, any form of boosting or takeoff, repeatedly claimed by Galor for global 
and regional economic growth, should be indicted by a clear change in the 
downward direction of the reciprocal values.  
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If the straight line fitting the reciprocal values of data remains undisturbed, it 
shows that there was no diversion to a faster or slower trajectory. In particular, if 
the straight line does not show a change in the downward direction (if the gradient 
of the trajectory of the reciprocal values remains constant) then there was no 
boosting in the economic growth. We obviously cannot claim a change of direction 
on an undisturbed straight line.   
If the reciprocal values of data follow a decreasing straight line, the growth is 
not stagnant but hyperbolic. However, the concept of stagnation is not supported 
even if the reciprocal values of data do not decrease linearly. Any monotonically-
decreasing trajectory will show that the postulate of stagnation followed by a 
takeoff at a certain time is not supported by data.   
To prove the existence of the epoch of stagnation it is necessary to prove the 
presence of random fluctuations often described as Malthusian oscillations. Such 
random fluctuations should be clearly seen not only in the direct display of data but 
also in the display of their reciprocal values. It they are absent then there is no 
support in data for claiming the existence of the epoch of stagnation. Furthermore, 
if data do not show a clear takeoff from stagnation to growth at the postulated time, 
then there is no support for Galor’s repeatedly-claimed takeoffs. However, if the 
reciprocal values of data follow a decreasing straight line, then they show, or at 
least strongly suggest, that the growth was hyperbolic. 
If the straight line representing the reciprocal values of data remains unchanged, 
then obviously there is no change in the mechanism of growth. It is impossible to 
divide a straight line into different sections and claim different mechanism of 
growth for each of such arbitrarily selected section. It is impossible to claim, for 
instance, a transition from stagnation to growth as repeatedly claimed by Galor in 
his Unified Growth Theory if the reciprocal values of data follow an undisturbed 
straight line. It is impossible to claim the existence differential takeoffs if there 
were no takeoffs.  It is also impossible to claim that the Industrial Revolution 
changed the economic growth trajectory if the reciprocal values of data 
demonstrate that there was no change, i.e. that their linear trend remained 
undisturbed. 
No-one has yet demonstrated the existence of Malthusian stagnation in the 
economic growth or in the growth of human population. For instance, Lee pointed 
out that “these models of Malthusian oscillations” are speculative when applied to 
the growth of human population (Lee, 1997, p. 1097). However, from the 
descriptions of Malthusian stagnation, its signature and the alleged escape from the 
Malthusian trap should be easy to identify. This signature is schematically 
presented in Figures 2 and 3. 
For the direct display of GDP data (Figure 2), the signature of the regime of 
Malthusian stagnation can be identified by random fluctuations or oscillations 
around an approximately horizontal line. Over much longer sections of time, 
perhaps extending over thousands of years, fluctuations around the horizontal line 
might be replaced by fluctuations around a certain irregular trajectory (increasing, 
decreasing or randomly oscillating), which would be probably difficult to describe 
mathematically because the general concept of Malthusian stagnation is that it was 
controlled by random forces. Such random forces are hardly expected to generate 
monotonically-increasing distributions (Artzrouni & Komlos, 1985; Lagerlöf, 
2006; McKeown, 2009; Komlos, 1989; van de Kaa, 2008). For the monotonically-
increasing distributions, random forces are either too weak or they average out 
(Kapitza, 2006) and the growth is controlled by a certain dominant force, which 
could be constant (for the exponential growth), increasing with time or with the 
size of the growing entity (as for the hyperbolic growth) or even decreasing (as for 
the logistic growth). 
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The signature of the “remarkable” or “stunning” escape from the Malthusian 
trap (Galor, 2005a, pp. 177, 220) to the sustained economic growth should be 
easily identified by a clear takeoff from the earlier stagnant distribution to a fast 
increasing growth. The alleged escape should occur around AD 1750 for developed 
regions and around AD 1900 for less-developed regions (Galor, 2008a, 2012a).  
For the reciprocal values of data (Figure 3), the epoch of Malthusian stagnation 
can be again identified by random fluctuations around an approximately horizontal 
line or around an irregular trajectory but the escape from the Malthusian trap will 
be identified by a clear downward trend. It should be noted that in the display of 
the reciprocal values of GDP data, small fluctuations are magnified, which means 
that in this display, epoch of Malthusian stagnation should be easy to identify 
because it should be characterised by strong fluctuations. 
Maddison’s data are indispensable in studying the historical economic growth 
but they have a strongly-limited range because they contain a large gap between 
AD 1 and 1000, and between AD 1000 and 1500. The most useful sets of data are 
from AD 1500. However, this shortcoming is immaterial because all the action 
described by Galor’s three regimes of growth takes place after AD 1500. Within 
the range of the good sets of data, i.e. commencing from AD 1500, we should see 
clearly all the hallmarks of Galor’s postulate of the three regimes of growth. We 
should see the signature of the regime of Malthusian stagnation, the effects of the 
Industrial Revolution, which was supposed to have been “the prime engine of 
economic growth” (Galor, 2005a, p. 212), the signature of the escape from the 
alleged Malthusian trap and a clear evidence of the uninterrupted era of the fast-
increasing and sustained economic growth after stagnation. All these features 
should be clearly displayed. If they are not, then there is no support in the data for 
Galor’s interpretations of the historical economic growth based on such distorted 
presentations of data as shown in Figure 1. Such presentations have no place in the 
scientific research.  
The discussion presented here is the extension of the mathematical analysis of 
the historical economic growth (Nielsen, 2016a). We have already demonstrated 
that the historical economic growth was hyperbolic and thus that implicitly it gives 
no support for the doctrine of the three regimes of growth. Now, we shall show it 
explicitly.   
It is essential to understand the fundamental features of hyperbolic distributions 
(Nielsen, 2014). Hyperbolic growth is slow over a long time and fast over a short 
time, but it is still the same, monotonically-increasing distribution, which is 
impossible to divide into two or three different, mathematically-justified 
components. The easiest way to see it, is by using the reciprocal values [see the eqn 
(2)] because the confusing hyperbolic growth is then represented by a decreasing 
straight line. It is then clear that it is impossible to divide such a straight line into 
distinctly different, mathematically-justified components and claim distinctly 
different mechanisms of growth for each of these arbitrarily selected components.   
Even though hyperbolic growth is slow over a long time it is not stagnant. Slow 
hyperbolic growth should never be interpreted as stagnant because if we want to 
interpret the slow perceived part of hyperbolic growth as stagnant, and governed by 
the usually assumed multitude of random forces, we should use precisely the same 
mechanism to explain the perceived fast growth. The perceived slow and fast 
components belong to the same, monotonically-increasing distribution. It is 
impossible to divide a monotonically-increasing hyperbolic distribution into the 
mathematically-justifiable slow and fast sections because it is obviously impossible 
to divide a straight line describing the reciprocal values and representing the 
hyperbolic distribution into distinctly-different and mathematically-justifiable 
sections (Nielsen, 2014). It is scientifically unjustifiable to use different 
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mechanisms of growth for such arbitrarily selected sections. Hyperbolic 
distributions have to be interpreted as a whole and the same mechanism has to be 
applied to the apparent slow growth and to the apparent fast growth. There is no 
clearly defined transition between the apparent slow and the apparent fast growth. 
These comments apply also to the income per capita distributions represented 
by the Gross Domestic Product per capita (GDP/cap). Such distributions are even 
more confusing than hyperbolic distributions. They are linearly-modulated 
hyperbolic distributions, i.e. the monotonically-increasing hyperbolic distributions 
representing the growth of the GDP modulated by the monotonically-decreasing 
linear distributions representing the reciprocal values of the size of the population 
(Nielsen, 2015b). A product or a ratio of monotonic distributions cannot generate a 
non-monotonic distribution. 
Even though the GDP/cap distributions appear to be made of two or maybe 
even three different components, as claimed incorrectly by Galor, they are 
increasing monotonically and it is impossible to divide them into distinctly 
different, mathematically-justifiable components. We can demonstrate it by 
calculating gradients or the growth rates of the GDP/cap distributions and by 
showing that they increase monotonically (Nielsen, 2015b). Any attempt to divide 
the GDP/cap distributions into distinctly-different components is strongly 
subjective and mathematically unjustified.  
 
4. Analysis of data for Western Europe 
We shall analyse two sets of data for Western Europe: (1) the data for 12 
selected countries and the data for the total of 30 countries. The 12 selected 
countries are made of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. 
According to Maddison (2010), in 2008, these 12 countries accounted for 85% of 
the total GDP of the 30 countries of Western Europe. The total of the 30 countries 
includes also Ireland, Greece, Portugal, Spain and 14 other small west European 
countries.  
The reason for analysing these two groups separately is that the listed 12 
countries represent the most advanced economies, where the effects of the 
Industrial Revolution and the escape from the Malthusian trap should be most 
clearly visible. Consequently, for these 12 countries we should expect the best 
agreement between the Unified Growth Theory and the data.  
Economic growth between AD 1 and 2008 in the 12 countries of Western 
Europe is shown in Figures 4 and 5. The growth in the total of 30 countries is 
shown in Figures 6 and 7.  
Hyperbolic parameters describing economic growth in the 12 countries of 
Western Europe are: 
11.147 10a and 55.961 10k . The corresponding 
singularity is in 1923 but the economic growth was diverted to a slower trajectory 
around 1900, bypassing the singularity by about 23 years.  
Hyperbolic fit to the data is remarkably good between AD 1500 and 1900 and 
acceptable below AD 1500. The point at AD 1 is only 27% higher than the fitted 
distribution and the point at AD 1000 is 54% lower. The critical range of time for 
testing the Unified Growth Theory is from AD 1500. It is in this range of time that 
we should be able to see transition from stagnation to growth and later a transition 
to the alleged sustained growth regime.  
The data presented in Figures 4 and 5 clearly demonstrate that there is no 
support for the existence of the alleged regime of Malthusian stagnation. However, 
there is a convincing support for the hyperbolic growth at least between AD 1500 
and 1900, the range of time where the signature of Malthusian stagnation should be 
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still clearly displayed for about 300 years. The data show that during that time 
economic growth was following a steadily-increasing hyperbolic trajectory. There 
is no sign of the existence of Malthusian stagnation. 
Absolutely nothing had happened at the end of the alleged Malthusian regime. 
There was no transition from stagnation to growth at any time. Around the time of 
the beginning of the postulated regime of sustained-growth, when the economic 
growth was supposed to have been launched from stagnation to a fast-increasing 
trajectory, the growth started to be diverted to a slower trajectory.  
It is remarkable also that the Industrial Revolution had absolutely no impact on 
shaping the economic growth trajectory in these 12 countries. They should 
experience the greatest benefits of this revolution and they probably did but these 
benefits did not boost the economic growth. Technological innovations were used 
in the economic growth but they did not change in the slightest the economic 
growth trajectory. In countries, where effects of the Industrial Revolution, “the 
prime engine of economic growth” (Galor, 2005a, p. 212), should have been most 
clearly reflected in the relevant data, we see no impacts of this engine. There must 
have been some other force, which was much stronger than any forces associated 
with the Industrial Revolution.  
This is an interesting issue, which should be studied and explained but it is 
futile to look for its explanation in the Unified Growth Theory. This interesting 
feature has not been even noticed by Galor, which is hardly surprising because it is 
hard or even impossible to carry out scientific research and draw reliable and 
scientifically-justified conclusions by repeatedly distorting data in such a way as 
shown in Figure 1. 
Galor’s Unified Growth Theory has no relevance to the description, let alone to 
the explanation of the mechanism of the economic growth, even in countries where 
his theory should be best fitted. Here, in the leading countries of Western Europe, 
where the effects of the Industrial Revolution should be most prominently 
displayed in the data describing economic growth, where the “remarkable” and 
“stunning” escape from the Malthusian trap (Galor, 2005a, pp. 177, 220) should be 
remarkably obvious, there are no signs of the impacts of the Industrial Revolution 
on the economic growth and no signs of any escape from the Malthusian trap, 
remarkable or less-remarkable, because there was no trap. Economic growth was 
increasing undisturbed and unconstrained along a hyperbolic trajectory until 
around 1900 when it started to be diverted to a slower but still fast-increasing 
trajectory.   
Galor’s three regimes of growth are totally dissociated from reality. They 
describe events that never happened. 
Stories and explanations presented by Galor in his theory have no relevance to 
the explanation of the mechanism of the economic growth even in these 12 leading 
countries of Western Europe. His stories might be explaining or describing 
something else, e.g. social conditions or the style of living, but even then one 
wonders about the degree of reliability of such descriptions. His narrative does not 
explain the mechanism of the economic growth.  
Results of the analysis of the economic growth in the total of 30 countries of 
Western Europe are presented in Figures 6 and 7. Hyperbolic parameters are: 
29.859 10a and 55.112 10k . The corresponding singularity is in 1929 
but the economic growth was diverted to a slower trajectory around 1900, 
bypassing the singularity by about 29 years. The point at AD 1 is 42% higher than 
the calculated hyperbolic distribution and at AD 1000 it is 48% lower.  
The analysis of the economic growth in the total of 30 countries of Western 
Europe leads to the same conclusions as for the 12 leading countries: Unified 
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Growth Theory is contradicted by the economic growth data in Western Europe 
where the effects discussed by Galor should have been most convincingly 
confirmed. In contrast, they are convincingly contradicted. 
 
5. Analysis of data for Eastern Europe 
Results of the analysis of economic growth in Eastern Europe, based on using 
Maddison’s data (Maddison, 2010), are presented in Figures 8 and 9. Hyperbolic 
parameters fitting the data are: 
17.749 10a and 44.048 10k . The point at 
AD 1 is 51% higher than the calculated curve. The singularity is in 1915 but the 
economic growth was diverted to a slower trajectory around 1890, bypassing the 
singularity by 25 years.  
Unified Growth Theory is clearly contradicted by the economic growth data for 
Eastern Europe. The epoch of Malthusian stagnation did not exist within the range 
of the mathematically-analysable data. Outside of this range, any claim about the 
existence of the regime of Malthusian stagnation and about its effects on the 
economic growth has to be based on questionable conjectures. Such a claim would 
be also in conflict with the analysable data.  
The data show no transition from stagnation to growth at any time because the 
growth was hyperbolic. There was no “remarkable” or “stunning” escape from the 
Malthusian trap (Galor, 2005a, pp. 177, 220) because there was no trap.  Industrial 
Revolution did not boost the economic growth in Eastern Europe.  
There was also no boosting of the economic growth at the time of the transition 
from the alleged post-Malthusian regime to the alleged sustained growth regime. 
Soon after the commencement of this phantom sustained-growth regime, economic 
growth in Eastern Europe started to be diverted to a slower trajectory. Galor’s 
regimes of growth are clearly dissociated from reality. They do not describe the 
real world but the world of fancy created by preconceived ideas and supported by 
the habitually-distorted presentation of data (Ashraf, 2009; Galor, 2005a, 2005b, 
2008a, 2008b, 2008c, 2010, 2011, 2012a, 2012b, 2012c; Galor & Moav, 2002; 
Snowdon & Galor, 2008). 
 
6. Analysis of data for Asia 
Asia (excluding Japan) is made primarily, if not exclusively, of less-developed 
countries (BBC, 2014; Pereira, 2011). According to Galor, this region should have 
experienced the epoch of stagnation until around 1900 followed by the post-
Malthusian regime commencing around that year. If Galor’s claims are correct, we 
should see clear signs of stagnation in the data until around 1900 and a clear 
transition (a dramatic takeoff) from stagnation to growth around that year.  
Economic growth in Asia between AD 1 and 2008 is presented in Figure 10. 
There is absolutely no correlation between the data and the three key events 
indicated in this figure: the Industrial Revolution, the alleged Malthusian regime 
and the alleged post-Malthusian regime, which were supposed to have been 
shaping the economic growth. 
During the alleged Malthusian regime of stagnation, economic growth in Asia 
was increasing hyperbolically at least from AD 1000 but the point at AD 1 is also 
not far from the calculated hyperbolic distribution. Parameters fitting the data are 
32.493 10a and 51.238 10k .   
The data show no signs of stagnation within their mathematically-analysable 
range, no signs of the Malthusian steady-state equilibrium and no signs of 
Malthusian oscillations. Assuming the existence of all such features is not only 
unnecessary but also scientifically unjustified because in science complicated 
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interpretations are rejected in favour of simpler explanations. The data follow a 
steadily-increasing hyperbolic distribution, suggesting a simple mechanism of 
growth because hyperbolic distributions are described by a simple mathematical 
formula [see the eqn (1)]. 
The concept of stagnation is dramatically contradicted by data and so is the 
transition to the alleged post-Malthusian regime, which was supposed to have been 
a transition from stagnation to growth. We see no such transition but a continuation 
of the hyperbolic growth. The claimed by Galor takeoff did not happen. There was 
a minor and hard-to-notice disturbance in the economic growth around 1950 but 
the growth soon returned to its historical hyperbolic trajectory. The overall 
evidence in the data is that the prop-up structures (the alleged different regimes of 
growth) used by Galor are not only totally redundant but also strongly misleading. 
They can, and even should, be removed because the data reveal a totally different 
pattern of growth.     
The data and their analysis show that nothing dramatic occurred during the 
alleged transition from the postulated Malthusian regime of stagnation to the 
alleged post-Malthusian regime, which is supposed to mark the escape from the 
postulated Malthusian trap and leading to a sustained growth regime. There was no 
escape from the trap because there was no trap. During the postulated Malthusian 
trap the economic growth was steadily increasing and it was obviously 
unconstrained. It is futile to claim random fluctuations and oscillations when there 
are none. Why should we even contemplate to make it all more complicated when 
the data show that the growth was much simpler? 
If not for Maddison and his data, the established knowledge in the economic 
research would have remained established, but now it has to be revaluated and 
changed. However, new insights should be welcome, particularly if they suggest a 
simpler explanation of the historical economic growth.  
Reciprocal values of the GDP data, 1/GDP, shown in Figure 11, also 
demonstrate that the Unified Growth Theory is contradicted by the same data, 
which were used during its development, the data published by Maddison in 2001 
(Maddison, 2001) but later extended to include economic growth during the 21st 
century (Maddison, 2010).  
During the alleged Malthusian regime of stagnation, reciprocal values of data 
were decreasing along a straight line indicating an undisturbed, hyperbolic 
economic growth. The data show also that nothing dramatic had happened at the 
end of this alleged epoch of stagnation. There was no transition to a new regime of 
growth. In particular, there was no transition from stagnation to growth, as claimed 
by Galor, but a continuation of the hyperbolic growth. The concept of the two 
regimes of growth is convincingly contradicted by data.  
 
7. Analysis of data for the former USSR 
Economic growth in the countries of the former USSR between AD 1 and 2008 
is presented in Figure 12. Reciprocal values of the GDP data, 1/GDP, are shown in 
Figures 13 and 14. The growth was hyperbolic between AD 1 and around 1870. 
Parameters describing hyperbolic growth are 
16.547 10a and 
43.452 10k . 
During the entire range of the mathematically-analysable data the epoch of 
Malthusian stagnation did not exist. Galor’s regimes of growth are hanging there 
without having any connection with data. The “remarkable” or “stunning” escape 
from the Malthusian trap did not happen because there was no trap. Galor’s 
Malthusian regime ends in the middle of nowhere. Absolutely nothing (remarkable 
or less-remarkable, stunning or less stunning) happened on the border between the 
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alleged Malthusian regime and the post-Malthusian regime. There was also no 
stunning or remarkable escape at the onset of the alleged sustained-growth regime. 
There was no dramatic increase in the economic growth. On the contrary, 
economic growth started to be diverted to a slower trajectory.  
What is remarkable about this confrontation of Galor’s theory with the 
empirical evidence is that there is such a consistently repeated and stunning 
disagreement between his theory and the data. The data also demonstrate that the 
Industrial Revolution had absolutely no impact on changing the economic growth 
trajectory in the countries of the former USSR. Here again we see that “the prime 
engine of economic growth” (Galor, 2005a, p. 212) did nothing to change to 
growth trajectory. Whatever this engine might have been doing, it certainly did not 
boost the economic growth. The data and their analysis give no support for the 
concept of Malthusian stagnation and for the assumption of the existence of the 
steady-state Malthusian equilibrium. Economic growth was increasing along a 
remarkably-stable hyperbolic trajectory. There was no escape from the Malthusian 
trap, let alone a “remarkable” or “stunning” escape as claimed by Galor (2005a, pp. 
177, 220), because there was no trap. The growth was unconstrained because the 
hyperbolic trajectory remained undisturbed.  
The concept of stagnation is dramatically contradicted by data and so is the 
alleged transition from stagnation to growth. Such a transition never happened. On 
the contrary, from around 1870, economic growth in the countries of former USSR 
started to be diverted to a slower trajectory, away from its faster, historical 
hyperbolic trajectory.   
 
8. Analysis of data for Africa 
Africa is a perfect example of a cluster of countries, which belong to the group 
of less-developed and least-developed countries. Out of the total of 48 least-
developed countries in the world, 34 are in Africa (Bangla News, 2015; UNCTAD, 
2013). With just one minor exception, Africa is made entirely of less-developed 
and least-developed countries (BBC, 2014; Pereira, 2011). The exception is 
Western Sahara, a small country in transition made of around 586,000 people 
(UNDATA, 2015).  
Maddison’s data for Africa serve, therefore, as an excellent source of 
information to test Galor’s hypothesis of the existence of the distinctly different 
regimes of economic growth in less-developed regions. We shall demonstrate that 
this hypothesis is dramatically and clearly contradicted by data.  
Reciprocal values of data describing economic-growth in Africa are presented 
in Figure 15. Economic growth was clearly hyperbolic between AD 1 and around 
1820 because the reciprocal values follow a straight line. There was definitely no 
stagnation. The concept of the regime of Malthusian stagnation is clearly 
contradicted by data. To prove its existence one would have to demonstrate a 
stagnant state of growth characterised by random Malthusian oscillation around an 
approximately horizontal line as shown in Figure 3. The data contain no such 
signature. On the contrary they show a steadily-increasing and remarkably-stable 
hyperbolic growth. There are no signs of any possible fluctuations, which in this 
representation of data should be strongly magnified. 
Furthermore, Galor’s concept of Malthusian stagnation extending to 1900 
ignores not only the data between AD 1 and 1820 but also the clear and dramatic 
transition, which occurred around 1820. It was not a transition from stagnation to 
growth but from growth to growth, the transition from a slower but steadily-
increasing hyperbolic growth to a faster and steadily-increasing hyperbolic growth. 
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This pattern is in clear contradiction of the Unified Growth Theory (Galor, 2005a, 
2008a, 2011, 2012a).  
The concept of the regime of stagnation ignores the steadily-increasing 
economic growth before 1820, the dramatic change in the pattern of growth around 
that year and the new hyperbolic growth after 1820. The claim of Malthusian 
stagnation ending in 1900 for less-developed countries ignores also that absolutely 
nothing unusual had happened around that year. The economic growth continued 
undisturbed. The postulated Malthusian regime ends in the middle of nowhere. 
There is no justification for claiming the regime of Malthusian stagnation and no 
justification for terminating it in AD 1900 or at any other time because there was 
no stagnation. 
In addition, the data demonstrate the existence of a feature, which is ignored by 
Galor: the diversion to a slower trajectory around 1950 indicated by the upward 
bending of the trajectory of the reciprocal values. According to Galor, the 
economic growth was supposed to have been boosted from stagnation to growth (at 
the end of his alleged Malthusian regime) and launched into a fast-increasing 
growth, but data present an entirely different interpretation: economic growth was 
increasing fast along a hyperbolic trajectory during the alleged regime of 
Malthusian stagnation but shortly after the time of the postulated transition to a 
faster growth the data it started to follow a slower trajectory. Data tell one story, 
Galor tells another, and in science data have the priority. 
The disagreement between Galor’s theory and the data is also clearly 
demonstrated in Figures 17 and 18. Over the range of the mathematically-
analysable data the Malthusian regime did not exist. The data show no evidence of 
the features characterising the epoch of Malthusian stagnation.  In contrast, the data 
show steadily-increasing hyperbolic distributions.  
In his description of economic growth, Galor did not even notice that there was 
a strong transition around AD 1820, let alone that it was a transition from one 
hyperbolic distribution to another. He also did not notice that that the postulated 
epoch of Malthusian stagnation ends in the middle of nowhere (see Figure 18).  
Many important details are easily lost in the habitually distorted presentations of 
data (Ashraf, 2009; Galor, 2005a, 2005b, 2008a, 2008b, 2008c, 2010, 2011, 2012a, 
2012b, 2012c; Galor & Moav, 2002; Snowdon & Galor, 2008) as illustrated in 
Figure 1. It is hard or even impossible to draw reliable conclusions by using such 
distorted diagrams and by making no attempt to analyse data. Conclusions based 
on impressions are likely to be incorrect. It is hard or even impossible to do science 
without following the principles of scientific investigation. 
 
9. Analysis of data for Latin America 
Results of analysis of the economic growth in Latin America based on 
Maddison’s data (Maddison, 2010) are shown in Figures 19 and 20.  
The data suggest existence of two hyperbolic growth trajectories: a slow 
trajectory between AD 1 and 1500 and a fast trajectory between AD 1600 and 
1870. The slow trajectory is characterised by parameters 
14.421 10a and 
42.093 10k . The singularity for this trajectory was at 2113t . The fast 
trajectory is characterised by parameters 
01.570 10a and 48.224 10k . 
The singularity for this new trajectory was at 1910t . However, from around 
1870, i.e. from around the time of the alleged takeoff from stagnation to growth 
(Galor, 2008a, 2012a), economic growth in Latin America started to be diverted to 
a slower trajectory bypassing the singularity by a safe margin of 40 years. The 
illusion of a takeoff is replaced by a diversion to a slower growth.   
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The characteristic features of the economic growth in Latin America are similar 
to the features in Africa. In both cases, a slow hyperbolic growth was followed by a 
much faster hyperbolic trajectory and this transition can be correlated with the 
intensified colonisation of Latin America (Bethell, 1984). 
The data for Latin America are in clear disagreement with the Unified Growth 
Theory. The economic growth was slow before AD 1500 but there is no basis for 
claiming that it was stagnant. Hyperbolic trajectory between AD 1 and 1500 could 
be questioned but it is consistent with the similar, but much clearer, pattern in 
Africa and is in perfect agreement with the repeated evidence of hyperbolic growth 
in other regions. There is definitely no convincing support for the existence of the 
epoch of stagnation.  
The data show a brief economic decline between AD 1500 and 1600, which 
appears to be coinciding with the commencement of the intensified Spanish 
conquest (Bethell, 1984). However, from around AD 1600, economic growth in 
Latin America was following a fast-increasing hyperbolic trajectory. The change 
from a slow to fast economic growth occurred about 300 years before the alleged 
takeoff around 1900. Furthermore, as in Africa, it was not a transition from 
stagnation to growth but from hyperbolic growth to hyperbolic growth. This feature 
is ignored in the Unified Growth Theory. Remarkably also, at the time of the 
alleged “remarkable” escape from the Malthusian trap (Galor, 2005a, p. 177) in 
around AD 1900, economic growth in Latin America was already diverted to a 
slower trajectory.  
Unified Growth Theory presents a story, which is contradicted by data. There is 
no correlation between the data and the narrative of this theory. In his habitually 
crude display of data, Galor could not have seen all these important features. He 
appears to have been guided by the inherited ideas, which unfortunately he did not 
check by the rigorous analysis of the new and excellent data (Maddison, 2001) 
available to him at the time of the formulation of his theory. The updated 
compilation of the data describing the historical economic growth (Maddison, 
2010) was also available to him even before the publication of his book (Galor, 
2011) and certainly during his continuing disseminations of the same ideas after its 
publication. As mentioned earlier, any of these compilations can be used to show 
that his theory is fundamentally incorrect because during the time when there were 
supposed to have been transitions between these alleged regimes of growth each of 
these two compilation shows a clear disagreement with Galor’s theory.  
 
10. Summary and conclusions 
We have analysed economic growth in Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Asia, 
former USSR, Africa and Latin America (Maddison, 2010). We have found that 
the fundamental concepts of the Unified Growth Theory (Galor, 2005a, 2011) are 
contradicted by the same data, which were used but never analysed during the 
formulation of this theory.  
The wished-for events did not happen. The real world refused to comply with 
the preconceived ideas and with the imagined interpretations, which were creating 
such an attractive story. 
It seems to be obvious that the Industrial Revolution should have a strong and 
decisive effect on the economic growth but it did not. It seems to be obvious that a 
slow growth is stagnant but it is not. What seems to be obvious is not necessarily 
true. It is obvious that the Sun moves around the Earth but it does not. “It is clear 
that the earth does not move, and that it does not lie elsewhere than at the centre” 
(Aristotle). 
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Empirical evidence has to be methodically and carefully analysed; otherwise we 
shall be creating our own stories, which might be interesting, exciting and 
convincing but they will be stories of fiction. They will have nothing to do with 
science. In science we learn from nature. Any attempt to mould nature into the 
image fashioned by our creative imagination is bound to fail and the perfect 
example is the Unified Growth Theory. 
Within the range of the mathematically-analysable data, the three regimes of 
growth, the Malthusian regime, the post-Malthusian regime and the sustained-
growth regime did not exist. There is no correlation between the data and these 
three postulated regimes of growth. In particular, there was no escape from the 
Malthusian trap because there was no trap.  
During the time described by the mathematically-analysable data, economic 
growth was hyperbolic and generally undisturbed. Only most recently, around the 
time when according to the Unified Growth Theory it should have been boosted 
from stagnation to growth, economic growth started to be diverted from the fast-
increasing hyperbolic trajectories to slower trajectories. Unified Growth Theory 
does not explain, let alone describe the historical economic growth because it is 
based on the fundamentally incorrect premises. 
The concept of the three regimes of growth was supported by the distorted 
presentation of data (Ashraf, 2009; Galor, 2005a, 2005b, 2008a, 2008b, 2008c, 
2010, 2011, 2012a, 2012b, 2012c; Galor & Moav, 2002; Snowdon & Galor, 2008). 
When properly displayed and analysed, the same data show that the Unified 
Growth Theory is fundamentally incorrect. 
The reliable and correct interpretation of the historical economic growth might 
appear to have no practical application because what was in the past is in the past. 
Why should the distant past have any influence on our present economic growth? 
However, the correct understanding of the past economic growth may well decide 
about our future.  
Galor’s interpretations of the historical economic growth are not only 
scientifically unacceptable but also dangerously incorrect because they create the 
false sense of security. They present a picture of the unsustained economic growth 
in the past and of a transition to a new era of sustained economy after the 
“remarkable” or “stunning” escape from the Malthusian trap (Galor, 2005a, pp. 
177, 220). At last, after the endless suffering, straggle, and deprivation, humans 
escaped the tyranny of the Malthusian regime and now they can enjoy the sustained 
economic growth with its prosperous future. This is a pleasing story but the 
opposite is true.  
Rigorous analysis of data shows convincingly that the past economic growth 
was sustained and secure because it followed the remarkably stable hyperbolic 
trajectories (Nielsen, 2016a). This conclusion is in harmony with the study of 
ecological footprints, which shows that until the late 1900s global ecological 
footprint was lower than the ecological capacity (WWF, 2010). It was in the past 
that the economic growth was not only sustained but also sustainable. Now it is 
not, because it is supported by the increasing ecological deficit. Indeed, 
mathematical analysis of the economic growth shows that its future is insecure 
(Nielsen, 2015a).  
Economic growth was not in a trap in the past but now it is in a trap of our 
continuing drive to increase not only the GDP but also the GDP/cap. We seem to 
see no limit to prosperity but the limit is imposed by the ecological limits and by 
the fast-increasing trajectories of economic growth. While the Unified Growth 
Theory suggests a prosperous future based on the “sustained growth regime” after 
the alleged “Malthusian regime,” the data indicate that unless we take decisive 
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steps to control the current economic growth our future is insecure (Nielsen, 
2015a).  
In its present form, Galor’s Unified Growth Theory is unacceptable. It has to be 
either thoroughly revised or rejected and replaced by a new theory aimed at 
explaining why the economic growth was hyperbolic in the past, why it was 
increasing along such remarkably stable trajectories, why it started to be diverted to 
slower, but still fast-increasing, trajectories and, most importantly, how to create a 
sustainable economic future. 
Propelled by the gained momentum of the historical economic growth, the 
current growth continues to increase too fast. It has to be slowed down. The 
sustainable and secure economic growth has yet to be created. It has not been 
created automatically at the end of the alleged but non-existent Malthusian regime 
as suggested incorrectly by the Unified Growth Theory. 
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Appendix 
 
 
Galor’s habitually distorted presentation of data 
 
 
Figure 1. Example of the ubiquitous, grossly-distorted and self-misleading diagrams used to create 
the Unified Growth Theory (Galor, 2005a, 2011). Madison’s data (Maddison, 2001) were used during 
the formulation of this theory but they were never analysed. Such a state-of-the-art was used to 
construct a system of scientifically-unsupported concepts, interpretations and explanations. These 
erronous concepts are now repeatedly contradicted by the same data, which were used during the 
formulation of this theroy.  
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Schematic diagrams of the signatures of Malthusian stagnation and takeoffs 
 
 
 
Figure 2. The direct display of hypothetical GDP data serving as the schematic representation of the 
signature of Malthusian stagnation (fluctuations around an approximately horizontal line) followed by 
the escape from the Malthusian trap into the sustained economic-growth regime around AD 1750 for 
developed regions and around AD 1900 for less-developed regions as claimed by Galor (2005a, 
2008a, 2011, 2012a). If these signatures are missing, Unified Growth Theory is contradicted by data. 
 
 
Figure 3. The display of the reciprocal values of the same hypothetical data as shown in Figure 2, 
serving as the schematic representation of the signature of Malthusian stagnation (fluctuations around 
an approximately horizontal line) followed by the escape from the Malthusian trap into the sustained 
economic-growth regime around AD 1750 for developed regions and around AD 1900 for less-
developed regions as claimed by Galor (2005a, 2008a, 2011, 2012a. If these signatures are absent, the 
Unified Growth Theory is contradicted by data. 
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Western Europe 
 
Figure 4. Economic growth in the 12 selected countries of Western Europe representing the most-
advanced economies where the Unified Growth Theory should have the strongest confirmation. There 
was no transition from stagnation to growth at any time because ther was no stagnation. The growth 
was hyperbolic before and after the alleged transition around AD 1750. Industrial Revolution did not 
boost the economic growth. The “remarkable” or “stunning” escape from the Malthusian trap (Galor, 
2005a, pp. 177, 220) did not happen because there was no trap. Galor’s three regimes of growth have 
no relevance to the description, let alone to the explanation, of the mechanism of the economic 
growth. During the alleged sustained growth regime, when the economic growth was supposed to 
follow a fast-increasing trajectory after the epoch of stagnation, economic growth was diverted to a 
slower trajectory. 
 
 
Figure 5. Reciprocal values of the GDP data, 1/GDP, for the economic growth in the 12 selected 
countries of Western Europe. Unified Growth Theory (Galor, 2005a, 2011) is contradicted by 
Maddison’s data (Maddison, 2010). Galor’s three regimes of growth have no relevance to the 
description, let alone to the explanation, of the mechanism of the economic growth. There was no 
transition from stagnation to growth at any time because there was no stagnation. There was no 
“remarkable” or “stunning” escape from the Malthusian trap (Galor, 2005a, pp. 177, 220) because 
there was no trap. Industrial Revolution did not boost the economic growth even in the countries 
where its effects should be most pronounced. During the alleged sustained growth regime, when the 
economic growth was supposed to follow a fast-increasing trajectory after the epoch of stagnation, 
economic growth was diverted to a slower trajectory, as indicated by the upward bending of the 
trajectory of the reciprocal values. 
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Figure 6. Economic growth in the total of 30 countries of Western Europe. The data give no clear 
support for the existence of the alleged Malthusian regime of stagnation. Industrial Revolution did not 
boost the economic growth in Western Europe. The “remarkable” or “stunning” escape from the 
Malthusian trap (Galor, 2005a, pp. 177, 220) did not happen because there was no trap. Galor’s three 
regimes of growth have no relevance to the description or to the explanation of the mechanism of the 
economic growth in Western Europe. During the alleged sustained growth regime, when the economic 
growth was supposed to follow a fast-increasing trajectory after the epoch of stagnation, economic 
growth was diverted to a slower trajectory. 
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Figure 7. Reciprocal values of the GDP data, 1/GDP, for the economic growth in the total of 30 
countries of Western Europe. Unified Growth Theory (Galor, 2005a, 2011) is contradicted by 
Maddison’s data (Maddison, 2010). Galor’s three regimes of growth have no expected correlation 
with data. There was no transition from stagnation to growth at any time because there was no 
stagnation. There was no “remarkable” or “stunning” escape from the Malthusian trap (Galor, 2005a, 
pp. 177, 220) because there was no trap. Industrial Revolution did not boost the economic growth in 
Western Europe. During the alleged sustained growth regime, when the economic growth was 
supposed to follow a fast-increasing trajectory after the epoch of stagnation, economic growth was 
diverted to a slower trajectory 
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Eastern Europe 
 
 
Figure 8. Economic growth in Eastern Europe. Galor’s three regimes of growth have no relevance to 
the description, let alone to the explanation, of the mechanism of the economic growth. Unified 
Growth Theory is contradicted by data. The alleged Malthusian regime of stagnation did not exist. 
Industrial Revolution did not boost the economic growth in Eastern Europe. The “remarkable” or 
“stunning” escape from the Malthusian trap (Galor, 2005a, pp. 177, 220) did not happen because there 
was no trap.  During the alleged sustained growth regime, when the economic growth was supposed to 
follow a fast-increasing trajectory after the epoch of stagnation, economic growth was diverted to a 
slower trajectory 
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Figure 9. Reciprocal values of the GDP data, 1/GDP, for the economic growth in Eestern Europe. 
Unified Growth Theory (Galor, 2005a, 2011) is contradicted by Maddison’s data (Maddison, 2010). 
Galor’s three regimes of growth have no expected connection with data. There was no transition from 
stagnation to growth at any time because there was no stagnation. There was no “remarkable” or 
“stunning” escape from the Malthusian trap (Galor, 2005a, pp. 177, 220) because there was no trap. 
Industrial Revolution did not boost the economic growth in Eastern Europe. Galor’s theory has no 
relevance to the description, let alone to the explanation, of the mechanism of the economic growth. 
During the alleged sustained growth regime, when the economic growth was supposed to follow a 
fast-increasing trajectory after the epoch of stagnation, economic growth was diverted to a slower 
trajectory, as indicated by the upward bending of the trajectory of the reciprocal values. 
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Asia (excluding Japan) 
 
 
Figure 10. Economic growth in Asia (excluding Japan) between AD 1 and 2008. Maddison’s data 
(Maddison, 2010) are compared with the hyperbolic distribution and with their unsubstantiated 
interpretations promoted by Galor (2005a, 2011). Economic growth was hyperbolic from at least AD 
1000 until 2008. The minor delay after the Industrial Revolution was followed by the compensating 
recovery.  The concept of Malthusian regime of stagnation is contradicted by data. The escape from 
the Malthusian trap never happened because there was no trap. There was no dramatic transition from 
stagnation to growth because there was no stagnation. 
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Figure 11. Reciprocal values of the GDP data, 1/GDP, for Asia (excluding Japan) demonstrate that 
there is no correlation between the claimed events (Industrial Revolution, the alleged Malthusian 
regime of stagnation and the alleged post-Malthusian regime) and the data (Maddison, 2010). The 
postulated dramatic and remarkable takeoff around 1900 never happened. The Malthusian regime of 
stagnation and the post-Malthusian regime did not exist.  
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Former USSR 
 
 
Figure 12. Economic growth in countries of the former USSR between AD 1 and 2008, as represented 
by Maddison’s data (Maddison, 2010), is compared with the hyperbolic distribution and with the 
unsubstantiated interpretations of the mechanism of growth proposed by Galor (2005a, 2008a, 2011, 
2012a). The alleged Malthusian regime of stagnation did not exist and neither did the alleged post-
Malthusian and sustained-growth regimes. The Industrial Revolution had absolutely no impact on 
changing the economic growth trajectory. There was also no dramatic transition to a new and faster 
economic growth after the alleged epoch of stagnation, no transition from stagnation to growth at any 
time because there was no stagnation.There was no escape from the Malthusian trap because there was 
no trap.  In place of all these imaginary and wished-for features there was the undisturbed and well-
sustained hyperbolic growth. During the alleged “sustained growth regime” (Galor, 2005a, 2011), 
when the economic growth was supposed to follow a fast-increasing trajectory after the epoch of 
stagnation, economic growth was diverted to a slower trajectory.  
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Figure 13. Reciprocal values of the GDP data, 1/GDP, for the former USSR are compared with the 
hyperbolic distribution represented by the decreasing straight line. There was no stagnation. 
Throughout the entire range of the alleged Malthusian regime during the AD era, economic growth 
was hyperbolic. 
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Figure 14. The end part of the plot of the reciprocal values of the GDP data, 1/GDP, for the former 
USSR. Economic growth was hyperbolic until around AD 1870 when it started to be diverted to a 
slower trajectory indicated by an upward bending of the reciprocal values. Industrial Revolution did 
not boost the economic growth. The alleged Malthusian regime of stagnation did not exist and there 
was no transition from stagnation to growth at any time because there was no stagnation. The 
“stunning” or “remarkable” escape from the Malthusian trap (Galor, 2005a, pp. 177, 220) did not 
happen because there was no trap. During the alleged sustained growth regime, when the economic 
growth was supposed to follow a fast-increasing trajectory after the epoch of stagnation, economic 
growth was diverted to a slower trajectory. 
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Africa 
 
Figure 15. Reciprocal values of the GDP data (Maddison, 2010) for Africa compared with the 
hyperbolic distributions represented by the decreasing straight lines. The two distinctly different 
regimes of growth postulated by Galor (2005a, 2008a, 2011, 2012a) did not exist. There was no 
transition from stagnation to growth at any time because there was no stagnation. 
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Figure 16. Reciprocal values of the GDP data (Maddison, 2010) for Africa between AD 1500 and 
2008 compared with the hyperbolic distributions represented by the decreasing straight lines. The two 
distinctly different regimes of growth postulated by Galor (2005a, 2008a, 2011, 2012a) did not exist. 
His postulate ignores the data. There was no transition from stagnation to growth because there was no 
stagnation. During the alleged post-Malthusian regime, when the economic growth was supposed to 
start to follow a fast-increasing trajectory after the alleged epoch of stagnation, economic growth was 
diverted to a slower trajectory. 
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Figure 17. GDP data (Maddison, 2010) for Africa between AD 1 and 2008 compared with hyperbolic 
distributions. The two distinctly different regimes of growth postulated by Galor (2005a, 2008a, 2011, 
2012a) did not exist. His postulate ignores the data. There was no stagnation and no transition to a 
faster growth at the end of the alleged regime of Malthusian stagnation. There was no escape from the 
Malthusian trap because there was no trap. During the alleged post-Malthusian regime, when the 
economic growth was supposed to start to follow a fast-increasing trajectory after the alleged epoch of 
stagnation, economic growth was diverted to a slower trajectory 
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Figure 18. GDP data (Maddison, 2010) for Africa between AD 1500 and 2008 compared with 
hyperbolic distributions. The two distinctly different regimes of growth postulated by Galor (2005a, 
2008a, 2011, 2012a) did not exist. His postulate ignores the data. The data are in clear contradiction of 
Galor’stheory. There was no transition from stagnation to growth because there was no stagnation. 
During the alleged post-Malthusian regime, when the economic growth was supposed to start to 
follow a fast-increasing trajectory after the alleged epoch of stagnation, economic growth was diverted 
to a slower trajectory 
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Latin America 
 
 
 
Figure 19. Economic growth in Latin America between AD 1 and 2008. Maddison’s data (Maddison, 
2010) are compared with hyperbolic distributions and with their unsubstantiated interpretations 
proposed by Galor (2005a, 2008a, 2011, 2012a). The data suggest two hyperbolic distributions, the 
pattern similar to the economic growth in Africa. The alleged transition from stagnation to growth 
never happened because the economic growth was not stagnant but hyperbolic. Around the time of 
the postulated by Galor “remarkable” escape from the alleged Malthusian trap (Galor, 2005a, p. 177) 
at the end of the alleged regime of stagnation, the economic growth started to be diverted to a slower 
trajectory. There was no escape from the Malthusian trap because there was no trap. 
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Figure 20. Reciprocal values of the GDP data, 1/GDP, for Latin America between AD 1 and 2008. 
Maddison’s data (Maddison, 2010) are compared with hyperbolic distributions represented by the 
decreasing straight lines and with their unsubstantiated interpretations proposed by Galor (2005a, 
2008a, 2011, 2012a).  During the alleged regime of stagnation, the growth was hyperbolic. The data 
suggest two hyperbolic distributions, the pattern similar to the economic growth in Africa. The 
alleged transition from stagnation to growth around AD 1900 did not happened because there was no 
stagnation. Around the time of the alleged takeoff from stagnation to growth, the economic growth 
started to be diverted from the fast-increasing hyperbolic trajectory to a slower trajectory as indicated 
by the upward bending of the trajectory of the reciprocal values. There was no escape from the 
Malthusian trap because there was no trap. The transition from the slow to fast growth occurred 
around 300 years before the expected takeoff in AD 1900 and it was not a transition from stagnation 
to growth but from growth to growth. This feature, as well as the diversion to a slower trajectory at 
the time of the claimed takeoff around AD 1900, is not even noticed in the Unified Growth Theory. 
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